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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2099 
___________ 
 
MIGUEL ORELLANA-GARCIA, 
 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-320-156) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 21, 2012 
 
Before:  FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 29, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Miguel Orellana-Garcia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United 
States with his family at the age of nine without inspection in 1996.  After Orellana-
Garcia pleaded guilty to a marijuana offense in 2007, the Government charged him as 
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removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) for having violated a law relating to a 
controlled substance.  He conceded the charge and applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on his 
membership in a particular social group.  In particular, he argued that as a young 
Salvadoran male raised in the United States (with the characteristics and attributed 
characteristics of such a person), he faced a risk of persecution by gangs in El Salvador. 
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that Orellana-Garcia’s asylum 
application was time-barred, and denied his other applications.  Orellana-Garcia appealed 
the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and sought a remand based on 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011). 
The BIA dismissed Orellana-Garcia’s appeal.  The BIA upheld the denial of the 
asylum application as time-barred.  Among other things, the BIA also concluded that, 
even assuming that Orellana-Garcia had articulated membership in a particular social 
group, he had failed to establish that any claimed past mistreatment or fear of future harm 
rose to the level of persecution or was on account of a protected ground.  The BIA also 
denied Orellana-Garcia’s motion to remand as unnecessary under the facts of his case 
because he had failed to establish that any past or feared future harm rose to the level of 
persecution or that any harm was on account of any protected ground. 
 Orellana-Garcia presents a petition for review.  He puts forth three claims of error.  
He contends that the BIA should have remanded his case; that the BIA committed legal 
error by holding that the persecution he feared was not on account of a protected ground 
 
3 
regardless of whether he showed a cognizable social group; and that the BIA erred in 
finding that the harm he fears does not rise to the level of persecution.1
 We first consider our jurisdiction and conclude that we may consider all three 
questions.  The basis for Orellana-Garcia’s removal is his conviction for a controlled 
substance violation, so our jurisdiction is limited under the REAL ID Act to 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) & (D); see 
also Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2000).  Our review of questions of law 
includes, under these circumstances, review of applications of law to facts.  Cf. Silva-
Rengifo v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Kamara v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005), for the 
proposition that the “jurisdictional grant regarding appeals by aggravated felons extends 
not just to legal determinations but also to application of law to facts”). 
  The Government 
argues that the latter two claims do not come within our jurisdiction in this case and the 
first is without merit, and accordingly requests that we dismiss the petition in part and 
deny it in part. 
Accordingly, we may consider not just the legality of the denial of the request for 
a remand, but also the question whether the feared harm constitutes persecution.  Cf. 
Toussaint v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that we may review, as an application of law to facts, a question that relates 
                                              
1 As the Government asserts, Orellana-Garcia has waived all other claims.  See 
Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 609 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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not to disputed facts, but to whether the facts, if accepted as true, would demonstrate that 
a person would be subject to persecution).  Also, Orellana-Garcia presents a legal 
question in his remaining argument insomuch as the essence of his argument is that the 
BIA should not have ruled on whether any persecution was “on account of” a protected 
ground independently of its analysis of the “social group” question. 
 Upon review, we will deny the petition.  In considering the “social group” 
question, the IJ in Orellana-Garcia’s case did rely on the “social visibility” requirement 
subsequently rejected in Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604.  However, the IJ and the 
BIA also ruled that even if Orellana-Garcia had shown that he was a member in a 
particular social group, he had not shown that he would be targeted on account of that 
basis.  Although Orellana-Garcia argues to the contrary, this conclusion could be reached 
without resolving the social group question in this case.  Cf. Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney 
Gen. of the United States, 527 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008) (ruling that it was not 
necessary to determine if there was a “particular social group” in that case where there 
was substantial evidence that the petitioner had not been mistreated because of her 
membership in the group she described). 
The BIA’s conclusion that Orellana-Garcia would not be targeted on account of a 
protected ground is supported by substantial evidence.  As the BIA explained, Orellana-
Garcia had merely speculated that his family members’ past experiences were with gang 
members, and his fear of future harm was equally speculative.  Orellana-Garcia did not 
provide any evidence that he has been or will be targeted specifically.  To the extent he 
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raised a more specific threat of harm from someone who does not wish to pay back a 
loan, he described a personal dispute unrelated to his membership in any particular social 
group.  Cf. Shehu v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that mistreatment resulting from the bare desire for money is not persecution on 
account of a protected ground). 
Furthermore, and given the speculative nature of Orellana-Garcia’s claims, 
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harm Orellana-Garcia feared 
did not rise to the level of persecution.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494-95 
(3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that ordinary criminal activity does not rise to the level of 
persecution); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that the “concept of 
persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or 
even unlawful or unconstitutional”). 
Given that the BIA could, and did, provide a rationale for its decision independent 
of the resolution of the social group question in this case, a remand to the IJ was not 
necessary despite our intervening ruling in Valdiviezo-Galdamez.  Accordingly, the BIA 
did not err in denying the motion to remand under the circumstances of this case. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
